

# Chapter 2 - What is a philosophy of the art of living?

## The role of the art of living in the history of philosophy

Philosophy shall initially be understood here as a moment of pause and reflection, a space of freedom and leisure to ask questions that would otherwise not receive any attention, or which might not be asked at all where spaces are more clearly defined and time is precious. Among these are questions about the existence of humanity, the essence of being, the structures of our world, the possibility of understanding – but also simply questions such as: What is life? And especially: *How can I lead my life?* It is the latter question that has not had a place in recent academic philosophy<sup>1</sup>: throughout modernity, the contemplation of seemingly trivial life-questions, and the questions raised in the context of the art of living, has been nearly completely abandoned by philosophy as a discipline. That this strict rejection cannot be upheld in this form has two main reasons.

The first one results from an increased fallback on the *ancient* philosophy of the art of living: since the mid 20<sup>th</sup> century, a number of scattered papers have been published, which provide the historical references that re-situate the art of living as an essential element of philosophy as a discipline.<sup>i</sup> These papers, on the one hand, regarded philosophy *as* an art of living: a deliberate practice of the art of living by philosophers as a form of life (which is one reason why certain individuals have been considered “philosophers” in ancient times; they practised a reflected way of living). On the other hand, some considered a philosophy *of* the art of living: a reflection on aspects that are relevant for a deliberate way of life, as well as on the relevant terms and concepts, independent of a specific way of living. The other reason reaches back to the critical question of the self-conception of philosophy in the context of the student movement of 1968, which led some German and French thinkers to re-discover the ‘conduct of life’ and the ‘art of living’ as genuine questions of philosophy<sup>ii</sup>. Foucault adopted impulses from classical-philosophical research as well as from what followed from 1968, when he dedicated himself to the development of an ethics that is understood as an art of living.<sup>iii</sup>

It seems worthwhile to revisit the question of the art of living in the history of philosophy to identify some of its main features and fundamental concepts that are subject for debate, to be reconsidered or redefined for a new foundation of the art of living. In light of this history, it becomes apparent in how far a *philosophical* understanding of what we can call an art of living differs from a *popular* understanding of the term. This comes to the fore in two anecdotes about Thales von Milet, whose interpretation played a significant role in the history of philosophy<sup>iv</sup>: the Thracian maid that laughs about Thales, who does not see the fountain in front of his eyes, exemplifies an art of living that takes its meaning from a practical mastery of the immediate,

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1 The topic of the art of living has seen some increasing attention over the last two decades, for example by authors such as Martha Nussbaum, Alexander Nehamas, Fred Feldman and others. However, all these texts have emerged after publication of Schmid’s original German version of this book.

experienced reality. Thales, the stargazer, failed to notice the immediate reality only in favour of another, which has a structural significance and can only be accessed through theoretical abstraction. The theoretical insight in seemingly abstract but indeed fundamental relationships enables him to deduct a future reality and to adjust to it well in time: the value of this is demonstrated – anecdotally – when he foresees, based on his scientific reasoning, a rich olive harvest and secures early on all olive presses only to rent them out later for steep fees, just to demonstrate his form of an art of living.

The notion that scientific insight and theorising can contribute to a reflected art of living can also be found in the case of Pythagoras, situated also in the 6<sup>th</sup> century before our common era, who uses arithmetic to deduct the musical laws that allow to harmonically tune one's soul, which in turn contributes to an even and balanced way of life. The theoretical *guidance* for a philosophical way of life in his school is accompanied by practical *exercise*, which aims towards an ascetic use of pleasures, a reasoning for friendship, the practice of silence, a daily evening self-reflection exercise in relation to one's goals, and the preparation for one's own death through meditation. Overall, it is a modest way of living and an acceptance of the structures of nature and fate that are at the heart here.

The desire for a conscious way of life evidently emerges from an uncertainty felt in a particular era, based on whichever historical circumstances. Some individuals do not feel comfortable in the community of a polis that loses its cohesion: this can be seen clearly in the 5<sup>th</sup> century in Athens. What might be a painful loss on the one hand, however, provides, on the other hand, a new, never experienced freedom: no longer does one have to follow a, by family and society, predestined lifestyle, no longer does one have to be subjugated to rigorous social control, but one is now able to develop one's own vision of a way of life. Answers to the questions of how such a life in freedom can be lived are given by Sophists, such as Protagoras, Gorgias, Hippias, and Prodikos. They provide guidance for critical thinking and knowledge, teach about life-techniques for a deliberate shaping of one's existence, and they pay particular attention to the question of power, which hence makes its first appearance in a reflection on the art of living: it is essential to gain personal, individual power, not to be subject to foreign powers. Of particular importance in this context is the power of rhetoric, which one needs to acquire to be able to navigate society and to be able to convince others. In this regard, rhetoric becomes an art of living.<sup>v</sup>

The historical circumstances of profound uncertainty drive the necessity for a *care of the self* (*epiméleia heautoû*), which Socrates adopts and develops methodically, and which leads to it becoming an influential notion in western history.<sup>vi</sup> Socrates reaches far and at the same time deeper than the Sophists in his endeavour to transfer the prevailing agitation and perplexity into a dialogic process to reciprocally justify the way in which one lives one's life and the questions that are raised in life. It is each individual's free choice to participate in this process of inquiry and to promote "scepticism" to unearth the underlying structures of an issue; what it 'is' and 'actually' is. The love for wisdom, which is philosophy, strives for insight into the nature of things to be able to live life in a proper and beautiful way. In continuation of Socrates, this approach culminates in Plato's teachings, who states that life has to be guided by the ideas of goodness, truth, and beauty. The

respective care, however, is, from the start, not just a care of the self but also a care for others and a care for the polis-community; it has likewise individual and political significance.

Ethics is at this point definitely no longer traditional custom, but it is justified through the position of each individual, his or her ethos; it emerges from the choice (*prohaíresis*) an individual makes, based on practical wisdom<sup>2</sup> (*phrónesis*), to reach the goal of excellence and felicity<sup>3</sup>. These central terms for any reflected art of living are discussed in Aristotle's "Nicomachean Ethics," in which he already reacts to the concern of the potentially isolated individual who does not require any other people; which is why he emphasises that only life in connection with others enables each individual to be free to make one's choices. Self-sufficiency<sup>4</sup> is a result of the confirmation of one's self in the grown and chosen relationships with others; which, not least, is the reason for the notions of friendship, friendship-with-oneself [*Selbstbefreundung* – translator's note] and "self-love" to have a dominant role in Aristotle's ethics. Even though the "Nicomachean Ethics" is already a significant reference point for a philosophy of the art of living, Aristotle, in his brochure for philosophy, "Protreptikos," points out, how much he considers philosophy to be a question for a deliberate way of life.

During this unsettled time, further arguments are developed which focus more and more on *self-sufficiency* (*autárkeia*), and which try to realise the same through practice (*áskēsis*). The Cynic art of living is characterised by considering self-sufficiency not so much as a theoretical but an existential notion, and by attempting to reach humility and substantial independence from external circumstances as much as possible through the practice of self-contentment.<sup>vii</sup> This practice can entail to use pleasures in a deliberate way, as well as to abdicate; in any case, it means to engage in a labour of self to strengthen one's own self. "To live a beautiful life," for Diogenes, means to live an autarkic, free life, and he considers it to be the task of philosophy to provide guidance to this end. The most beautiful and excellent between people is, however, candour [*Freimütigkeit* – translator's note], which finds its expression in the self-sufficiency of each individual.

Similarly, Epicurus considers autarky to be a "significant good," and its largest fruit to be freedom; its realisation shall be possible in every garden, which has become the symbol of the Epicurean art of living. It is a *garden of pleasures* without doubt, as it is a pleasurable life that is aimed for in a reflected way of living in this context. This does not mean, however, to indulge unrestricted in all pleasures, but to make selective use of pleasures ("not every pleasure we choose"<sup>5</sup>),<sup>viii</sup> as well as to minimise one's desires, so that the pleasures one does grant oneself be maximised and even the

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2 (All footnotes are translator's notes) Schmid uses the German term *Klugheit* to translate Aristotle's notion of *phrónesis*, which can be translated either with 'practical wisdom' or 'prudence.' Similarly, *phrónesis* has been translated with 'prudence' in some translations and 'practical wisdom' in others. In this book, either term will be used in places to translate the German term *Klugheit*, depending on the meaning that is most dominant in each context.

3 The term 'felicity' is used here to translate the German term *Glückseligkeit*, which could also be translated with happiness. However, the notion of 'happiness' is used rather broadly in various contexts and does not quite express the meaning of *Glückseligkeit*, which is closer related to Aristotle's notion of *eudaimonia*.

4 Schmid uses the German term *Selbstmächigkeit*, which can mean both: self-sufficiency and self-efficacy. I opted for self-sufficiency here, although both meanings are relevant and 'autarky' is probably a more accurate translation to capture both meanings. Schmid uses the term *Autarkie* as well, most likely as synonym for *Selbstmächigkeit*, but also deliberately later on as a concept. Therefore, I will make a distinction between the terms as in the German original.

5 This and all other direct quotes are my translations if not otherwise indicated.

smallest occasions provide the most satisfaction in life. In the realm of the garden, even those will become autarkic individuals who are usually disregarded in ancient society: women and slaves. In addition, the friendships that evolve within the garden will prevent individuals to only look after themselves. An egoistic hedonism can rather be found by Aristipp, but even for him it is important not to become a slave to one's pleasures but an autarkic human being, who is able to govern oneself.

The peak of the ancient philosophy of the art of living – in regard to the term *art of living* (Greek: *peri bion téchnē*, Latin: *ars vitae, ars vivendi*), the detail of its development, and its attention in the philosophical debate – is reached in Stoicism. The stoic art of living aims to escape the daily dealings occupying one's time, to turn towards oneself, care for oneself and to engage in *self-aquisition*<sup>6</sup> [*Selbstaneignung* – translator's note]: "Claim yourself for yourself" (*vindica te tibi*) is Seneca's guiding theme<sup>ix</sup> to allow one's, in this way fortified, self to tolerate adverse circumstances, accept hardships with serenity, and, if necessary, to defy fate. Similar to the role wood or bronze has for other artists, each individual's life becomes the material for their own art of life, according to Epictetus' handbook.<sup>x</sup> His strivings focus only on aspects that are within his power, everything else he accepts in a stoic state of "freedom from unsettledness" (*ataraxía*). Everything that can provide benefit or harm, he only expects from himself, not from external circumstances. After all, it is part of self-sufficiency to identify and acknowledge what is not within one's power.

In his "Moralia," Plutarch converts the heritage of centuries of philosophical reflection into a world-wise, modest form of life-wisdom, which, in his reasoning, is naturally situated within philosophy, as philosophy, "which is an art of living (*téchnē peri bion*), may not be excluded from either play or from pleasure or humour in any form; on the contrary, its presence is necessary everywhere to provide balance and the correct timing".<sup>xi</sup> Nothing that is relevant for human beings and life is alien to him, whether it be love, pleasures, marriage, friendship, enmity ("The benefit of enemies"), sorrow, praise, curiosity, or rage. Especially Michel de Montaigne, much later in the 16<sup>th</sup> century and with some historical distance, refers back to Plutarch seamlessly – after centuries in which themes and techniques of the ancient philosophy of the art of living have been preserved in a transformed form in Christianity, conveyed through monks and Fathers of the Church, such as Clemens of Alexandria and Johannes Chrysostomus; negated obviously by mediaeval scholasticism.

Besides Petrarca, Pico della Mirandola and Erasmus of Rotterdam, Montaigne is, through his "Essays," the big re-discoverer of the tradition of the philosophical art of living: it is philosophy, "which teaches us to live".<sup>xii</sup> His main innovation in contrast to tradition is the *essay*, which he considers not so much as a new literary form but as an existential attempt to experiment with his own existence and to put himself to the test: *J'essaie, je m'essaie, je me suis essayé* are his most used vocabulary. The necessity to experiment results from his sceptical position, in which all things, including one's self, is considered to be in a constant state of flux, nothing is accepted as ultimately fixed, and no position of certainty of knowledge can be adopted. If nothing can be considered self-evident, then everything has to be newly determined and an essayistic existence has to be lived. For

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6 Due to the grammatical structure of the German language, nouns can often be combined to form new meanings (often more specific through combining two dimensions of meaning). In this way, Schimd uses a range of nouns, some of which common, some of which new, to provide specific terminology for the meaning he wants to convey. To provide a close resemblance of his intended meaning, hyphenated nouns will be used regularly to translate these terms.

this, one does not need much wisdom, but a “little prudence” (*petite prudence*), which, for example, does not deny pleasures, but neither is ruled by them; which considers death, but does not lose sight of life either; which, finally, allows for “reverie” despite its open and prudent judgements.

Since Montaigne, a space has been created for the development of *morality* in the 17<sup>th</sup> and 18<sup>th</sup> century, often drawing on Stoicism, which can be characterised through the “instrumental determination of philosophy as rather technical art of conduct,” and in which the “formation of the practical (philosophy determined) everyday conduct of life” is at the heart of contemplation.<sup>xiii</sup> Even Descartes relies, in addition to his foundation of a new scientific methodology, on a *morale provisoire* as long as scientific insights are not able to reliably answer the most important life-questions. In their own way, moral thinking is represented in Spain by Baltasar Gracián; in France by La Rochefoucauld, La Bruyère, Montesquieu, Vauvenargues, and Chamfort; and in England and Scotland by Shaftesbury and Adam Ferguson.

Themes of any of the ancient, Socratic, Cynic, Epicurean, Cyrenian, and Stoic philosophies of the art of living can be found in works of thinkers and protagonists of the *enlightenment* in the 18<sup>th</sup> century, such as Voltaire, Rousseau, Diderot, de Sade, Helvétius, La Mettrie; as well as uncountable others, hardly known, and long forgotten *philosophes*, who exercise candour by ignoring the Christian verdict against self-love and the enjoyment of pleasures, again contemplating the importance of one’s relationship with oneself and the pleasures in life, and who practice a freedom of speech that prepares for a modern public. The philosophy of the enlightenment is connected through an immense labour of knowledge, which surmounts in an “Encyclopedia” that has the ethical-ascetic claim to impart individuals with self-confidence and self-sufficiency. An enlightened individual shall – not the least through the use of knowledge – no longer be subject to absolutist despotism, but to make oneself one’s own; he or she shall be able to learn to break away from the hegemony of the church and become self-governed.

In the German enlightenment-philosophy, a downright art of living-discourse seems to have taken place, which has been inaugurated by Christian Thomasius in his reference to Epicurus and Gracián.<sup>xiv</sup> Among others, he re-discovered the Stoic notion of self-acquisition and “care for our selves,” which allows to shape one’s own life like a work of art,<sup>xv</sup> as well as, similar to France, the rehabilitation of self-love.<sup>xvi</sup> The discourse at some point became evidently particularly dominant, and the claims of different authors, to possess exclusive validity and truth in their theses, became so unbearable, that Christoph Martin Wieland, who taught history of philosophy in Erfurt since 1769 for some time, wrote a book in 1778, at the time being an independent writer in Weimar: “Philosophy considered as art of living and art of healing for the soul”.<sup>xvii</sup> What he criticised is that type of philosophy that, in his view, exhausts itself in laying down too many rules. Only in ancient Greek has “this renown *art of living*, called *philosophy*,” come into being, whereas humans have managed without it for millennia. Likewise, in the age of enlightenment, humans would prefer to learn from life itself, through trial and error, to become masters through practice, without being too aware of it at all, in happy ignorance and with a certain lassitude. They should not be blamed for this ignorance and lassitude but protected from being “constantly the victim of some project” or some form of blind improvement of the world. This said, Wieland does not want to object against

the value of a “well thought out art of living,” but philosophy could not just come in to “teach us how to *live* based on the rules of its art;” at best it could be a remedy where nature is not sufficient.

Kant seemed to be similarly uncomfortable with the mix-up of different art of living approaches and their respective universal claims of differing maxims of prudence. Would the notion of prudence in this era, in which technique has started to become a derivative of science, develop from being an uncertain art since Aristotle’s time to an “art-of-living” with quasi-scientific claim that promises misguided happiness for everyone?<sup>xviii</sup> Kant’s answer has been to open a second layer of discussion beneath the layer of an art-of-living philosophy and an ethics of prudence, which was not intended to replace the latter but to provide a more fundamental approach. He, therefore, divided ethics as a whole into more specific conceptual terms: 1. a pragmatic, respectively *practical Anthropology* (which represents the layer of an art-of-living philosophy and an ethics of prudence), and 2. *morality* (which represents a meta-layer of ethical foundations and principles).<sup>xix</sup> He discussed the first aspect of ethics in his lectures about Anthropology, which he started in 1772/73 which is also close to the beginnings of his professorial lecturing, until the second semester in 1796 at the University of Königsberg. Kant finally revised them into his final book in 1798: “Anthropology from a pragmatic point of view” - the significance of which is not to be found in the level of detail of his argument but in the guiding idea of a potential for self-formation of each human being, which he states in what one “as freely acting being makes of oneself, or can and should make.”<sup>xx</sup> What is expressed here is the ability for self-reflection, but Kant also emphasises the full development of one’s senses and suggests techniques to develop and strengthen them (contrasting, renewal, change, increase of sensory impressions). Dreams and imagination are justified, and much space is dedicated to the question of how to deal with pleasures and to the “governance of one’s temper in relation to affects.”

Kant takes account of his second aspect of ethics in his “Groundwork of the metaphysics of morals,” which he outlined in 1765 already, but only published in 1785 in Riga. In it, no space is dedicated to prudence, but a moral principal is promoted which alone is supposed to be able to lay claim to universal application: to ask for every morally relevant action if the leading maxim could become common law, and if every person is always simultaneously considered as an end, not just as a means (the *categorical imperative*). However, Kant cannot avoid here to assume a strong self, who is able to understand the necessity of the moral principle, adopt it through a fundamental choice, and apply it in each individual case. For this reason, it is necessary to add to the fundamental duties towards others (truthfulness, benevolence) the fundamental duties towards oneself (sustainment of one’s life, self-bildung): to uphold and to strengthen the relationship of the self to oneself, which can be described appropriately as care of the self. In his “Metaphysics of morals” from 1797, this is made even more explicit: the formation of one’s mental, soul, and bodily abilities are described as “provision” of the self for oneself and practice of oneself, which Kant explicitly references back to Stoicism; which, however, also aligns surprisingly well with the notions of “dealing with oneself” and the “duties towards oneself” that can be found in Knigge’s book “On human relations” from 1788 (<sup>5</sup>1796).

However, Kant is, surprisingly in his lifetime already, only recognised for his a priori principles and the categorical duties, behind which the Kant of the care of the self and the philosophy of an art of

living disappears completely. Undoubtedly, Kant himself contributed to this single-sided perception through his rants against a “populist practical philosophy” and its “disgusting jumble of mixed-up observations and half-rationalistic principles.”<sup>xxi</sup> One recipient of this criticism would have been Christian Garve, who approached philosophy from a moralist perspective;<sup>xxii</sup> his book “Philosophical remarks and theses on Cicero’s books on duty” was published in 1783, to which Kant responded immediately with his “Groundwork.” Another advocate of art-of-living teachings has been Christoph Meiners, who, with an eye on Kant, demanded at the turn from the 18<sup>th</sup> to the 19<sup>th</sup> century to abandon the transformation of ethics as deontology and to return to what “the ancients usually called ethics, but also often referred to as art, or science of life, wisdom or prudence.”<sup>xxiii</sup> The interest with which Kant himself participated in the discourse of the art of living can be seen, for example, in his very detailed remarks towards Hufeland in regard to dietary<sup>7</sup> questions of the art of living.<sup>xxiv</sup>

At the end of the 18<sup>th</sup> and beginning of the 19<sup>th</sup> century, the discourse of the art of living continues mainly in two directions: in the mainstream oriented, traditional discourse on *dietetics*, which continues Hufeland’s line of argument,<sup>xxv</sup> as well as the philosophically oriented, newly established discourse on aesthetics: in a publication on the “Value of life,” Schleiermacher refers to the “art of living” in 1792/93; Schiller, in his 15<sup>th</sup> letter on the aesthetic education of men (1795), credits the art of living to be able to give beauty to human beings; Friedrich Schlegel references a “theory of the art of living” and Novalis the “art of living” in the journal “Athenäum”; all of the romanticist movement is interwoven with the efforts for this art.<sup>xxvi</sup> The term Romantic itself comprises the idea of a romantic art of living: a novel-like life, an aesthetic existence, a oneness with everything, an abolishment of time in an intense moment, and in this sense: the true life. Similarly, Schopenhauer’s “Wisdom of life,” which is intended to allow for a happy life in an unhappy world, as well as the early Nietzsche belong to the Romantic period. A somewhat unique approach to a “science of the art of living,” which is mostly adopted in the Spanish Romantic, is founded by Karl Christian Friedrich Krause.<sup>xxvii</sup>

It has to be established, however, that the extent to which Kant’s “pragmatic anthropology” has been neglected in the 19<sup>th</sup> century is noteworthy at the least. It was not recognised during the Romantic period, as it did not align well with the then less pragmatic understanding of the art of living; only the “aesthetics of the genius” in Kant’s “Critique of judgement” seemed useful. It also is not recognised by the newly developing scientific-technical *pragmatism*, as the rationalism of the scientific system, the functionality of technical practice and a society founded on a morality of duties does not provide a space for a pragmatic art of living understood as prudence and practical wisdom. Only Kant’s critiques of pure and practical reason have been considered useful.

In this way, Kant’s “Pragmatic anthropology” slides into the abyss of modernity, which spans between a rational, functional pragmatism and the already early on it opposing Romantic. However, despite the seemingly irreconcilability of these poles of modernity, they reference each other just as much: Romantics frame the ideals, which pragmatism promises to implement. Individuals of the

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7 Schmid uses the German terms *diätetisch* and *Diätetik*, which can be translated with ‘dietary’ and ‘dietetics’. The terms today are mostly associated with healthy food and drink; however, in Kant’s time, it encompassed all aspects of a wholesome lifestyle.

modern age are obsessed by the thought of a true life, they try to realise it through the possession of goods, which are beginning to be produced through industrial means, but they [the individuals] do not possess it [the true life – translator's notes]. The self-sufficiency of individuals, this similarly ancient as well as enlightened idea, is again forgotten.

The only voice in the wilderness of the modern world, in which technical dynamic and industrial organisation of labour seem to render prudence and practical wisdom of a pragmatic art of living redundant, is Nietzsche, who re-assumes the ancient idea of self-sufficiency and re-shapes it in his concept of the art of living.<sup>xxviii</sup> Particularly consequential, even though understandable in the historical social circumstances, is the rejection of the question of the art of living and an ethics from the perspective of an individual by Marx and Engels, and, subsequently, by Marxism. The possible consequences have been pointed out already by Max Stirner in his work "The individual and his property" from 1845; however, he only received the foolish scornful laughter of the protagonists of class struggle. The idle field of a philosophical art of living in the 20<sup>th</sup> century is instead addressed in psychotherapy and psychoanalysis, and new philosophies came into being, in which some themes of the art of living can be found. At the same time, however, a new scepticism is warranted towards a mainstream understanding of the art of living.



Please note that only some endnotes are presented in this example.

- i Paul Rabbow, Seelenführung. Methodik der Exerzitien in der Antike, Munic 1954. Ilsetraut Hadot, Seneca und die griechische-römische Tradition der Seelenleitung, Berlin 1969. Pierre Hadot, Philosophie as Lebensform. Geistige Übungen in der Antike, Berlin 1991 (partly not identical with the French version, Paris 1981). Albrecht Dihle, Philosophie als Lebenskunst, in Rheinisch-Westfälische Akademie der Wissenschaften, Vorträge G304, Pladen 1990. André-Jean Voelke, La philosophie comme thérapie de l'âme. Études de philosophie hellénistique? Paris 1995. Juliusz Domański, La philosophie, théorie ou manière de vivre? Les controverses de l'Antiquité à la Renaissance, Fribourg/Paris 1996. In relation to the philosophy of the art of living humoristic and anecdotal: Frédéric Pagès, Frühstück bei Sokrates. Philosophie als Lebenskunst, Damstadt 1993.
  - ii Raoul Vaneigem, Handbuch der Lebenskunst für die jungen Generationen (1967), Hamburg <sup>3</sup>1980. Wilhelm Kamlah, Philosophische Anthropologie. Sprachkritische Grundlegung und Ethik, Zürich 1972 – Kamlah proclaims an “ethics of the art of living” (idem, 167). Hans Krämer, Prolegomena zu einer Kategorienlehre des richtigen Lebens, in: Philosophisches Jahrbuch 83 (1976). Hanns-Josef Ortheil, Die Versuchung der “stillsten” Studien, in: Klassiker der philosophischen Lebensklugheit, Ergänzungsband, Stuttgart 1983. Hans Julius Schneider, Über das Schweigen der Philosophie zu den Lebensproblemen, Konstanz 1979 (Text of a lecture from 1976). Michel de Certeau, Kunst des Handelns (1980), Berlin 1988. Trutz Rendtorff, Ethik. Grundelemente, Methodologie und Konkretionen einer ethischen Theologie, 2 Bde. (1980 & 1981), 2. ext. vols. Stuttgart 1990 and 1991 – Rendtorff reclaims the conduct of life as an aspect of ethics (idem, vol. 1, 9ff, 130ff). Hans Krämer, Integrative Ethik, Frankfurt/M. 1992 – Krämer portrays the connection between onto-teleologic ethics and deontological ethics, in which the individual “ability-to-live” plays a significant role.
  - iii Michael Foucault, Der “Anti-Ödipus” - Eine Einführung in eine neue Lebenskunst, in: Foucault, Dispositive der Macht, Berlin 1978 (Foreword to the American translation by Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, Anti-Oedipus, New York 1977; the French original was published in 1972 without it); French original in Foucault, Dits et Écrits, Paris 1994, III, no. 189. See also Gilles Deleuze, Das Leben als Kunstwerk (Gespräch mit Didier Eribon, 1986), in Deleuze, Unterhaltungen. 1972-1990, Frankfurt/M. 1993. In regard of ancient-research see Michel Foucault, Der Gebrauch der Lüste (1984), Frankfurt/M. 1986; and Foucault, Die Sorge um sich (1984), Frankfurt/M. 1986. Compare Wilhelm Schmid (Ed.), Denken und Existenz bei Michel Foucault, Frankfurt/M. 1991. Arnold I. Davidson, Ethics as Ascetics: Foucault, the History of Ethics, and Ancient Thought, in Jan Goldstein (Ed.), Foucault and the Writing of History, Oxford 1994.
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- viii Ref.
- ix Ref.
- x Ref.
- xi Ref.
- xii Ref.
- xiii Ref.
- xiv Ref.
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- xix Ref.
- xx Ref.
- xxi Ref.
- xxii Ref.
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- xxvii Ref.
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